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
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THE TOPASSES OF TIMOR

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MAJOR C. R. BOXER

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THE TOPASSES OF TIMOR

For many years before Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope, Timor was known to the Chinese as a source of supply of the fragrant sandalwood, which in both the white and yellow variety, was in such demand for burning as incense in temples and Joss-houses. Chinese junks from Fukien and Kwangtung visited the island periodically, whilst the Portuguese found their way there soon after Albuquerque's conquest of Malacca in 1511. It was not until fifty years later that they made their first proper settlement in the Lesser Sunda islands, and then for the ensuing century the centre of their activities was not Timor, but the neighbouring island of Solor. The foundation of this settlement was due to the Dominicans, who, encouraged by the success of some preliminary conversions, built a stone fort on Solor in 1566, with the object of affording protection to the local Christian kampongs against Moslem raiders from Celebes and Java. Round this stone fort there grew up a settlement populated by native converts, and by the offspring of the Portuguese soldiers, sailors, and sandalwood traders from Malacca and Macao, who intermarried with the native women. This was the origin of that race of half-breeds who in the following century were termed *Toepassen* or *Swarte Portugeezen* by the Hollanders. The same term was also applied to the corresponding class of Eurasians and native Christians in India, Malacca, and Batavia by the Dutch and English (the latter, like the Portuguese, under the form of *Topasses* or *Topazes*) for over two hundred years. Its derivation is uncertain, but the ancient attribution of the Hindustani *Topi*, has much to commend it; since this class of persons often called themselves *Gente de Chapeo* in Portuguese, whilst the Indians also referred to them as *Topee Walas* or 'Hat-men'. Another explanation is that the term originated with the Dravidian *Tuppāsi*, 'interpreter'.

For the first twenty years of its existence, the captain of the fort of Solor was nominated by the Dominican Prior at Malacca, subject to confirmation by the Captain of that place, as may be seen from an original *Alvará* or Decree signed by Antonio Moniz Barreto, Governor of Portuguese India, dated 1576, in the writer's collection (see p. 21). Some twenty years later, the appointment was transferred to the Viceroy of India, the earliest recorded incumbent being Antonio Vilhegas. This captain's instructions, dated September 1595, will be found in the *Arquivo Portuguez Oriental*¹⁾, and appear to have escaped the notice of G. P. Rouffaer and other writers on the history of Solor and Timor.

About the turn of the century, the Dominicans had a total of twenty-seven

The numbers of the foot-notes in fat-faced type refer to those of the bibliography.

¹⁾ 1 fasciculo 5 pp. 1427—1430.

kampongs in Solor, Flores, and the neighbouring islands under their control, with converts numbering 100.000 according to their own estimate, or 12.250 if the slightly later and far more trustworthy Dutch accounts are to be credited. Their most important post after Solor was on the islet of Pulo Ende, on the south coast of Flores, where they had a coralstone fort, whose short but eventful history has been admirably reconstructed in a series of scholarly articles by Jhr. van Suchtelen and Dr. G. P. Rouffaer²⁾. It may be added *en passant*, that Dr. Rouffaer is mistaken in his natural supposition that the Portuguese had nothing more to do with Pulo Ende after their final expulsion from the fort in 1630. A Dominican narrative of 1665 records the dispatch of an expedition from Larantuka to the relief of the Christian kampongs on Pulo Ende, contemporaneously with the Dutch expedition to Macassar in 1660.

The main Dominican stronghold on Solor had an even more chequered career. Surprised, plundered, and partly burnt in an abortive native rebellion in 1598, it was soon rebuilt and restored, only to fall to a Dutch attack led by a Captain rejoicing in the curious name of Appollonius Scotte in April, 1613. He was described by Governor-General Both as being „een persoon wel ervaren, cloeck van verstandt, in de Spaensche tale seer prompt alsmede in't schrijven, die historien wel doorlesen, maer al te resoluut, te liberael, superbe, inconstant, bovenmate haestich van hooft Ick en soude niet geraden vinden dat men hem een trap hooger setten soude”³⁾. That Scotte was not „bovenmate haestich van hooft” as Both complained, is shown by the fact that he took 3 months to reduce the fort of Solor, on which „hadden wij geschoten over de 800 schoten met groff geschut; het selve is gelegen op een hoochte, seer sterck van gelegentheydt, van binnen seer bebouwt met metschwerk, licht dicht aende strandt, heeft aen wederzijden 2 diepe vaelleijen Wt het fort sijn wel getrocken over de duysent ziele waaronder over de 250 weerbaere swaerten ende mestijssen, ende omtrent de 30 Portegijssen sieck ende gesonde, met 7 Dominicaner monniken”⁴⁾. It is interesting to note that the yacht *Halve Maen* in which Henry Hudson had sailed on his fatal voyage to the frozen North, was one of the ships which took part in this expedition⁵⁾.

Perhaps Scotte would not have been able to capture the fort at all, but for the absence of the greater part of the garrison on a sandalwood-felling expedition to Timor, whence they returned „2 ofte 3 daegen naer dat het fort in ons geweld was, soo dat daer naer wel 80 wytte in getaele waeren, ende wel 450 mestijssen. Het accordt brengt mede dat alle die begeeren vertrecken sullen nae Mallacca”. They did not all leave for Malacca however, as Jan Pieterszoon Coen, writing to the Directors from Bantam on 10 November 1614 states that „eenighe Portugesen, mesticen, ende 2 dominicaner monicken op den eet van trouwicheyt op een sekere plaetse Larentoucque genaempt, nyet verder van 't Casteel Solor gelegen, soudén blyven resideren”⁶⁾.

This apparently harmless transfer of a few fugitives was the seed of a

²⁾ 22 and 20.

³⁾ 24 p. 275 note 3; see also the biography of Scotte in 27 p. CXVII.

⁴⁾ 23 I p. 12 sqq.

⁵⁾ 16 p. 104.

⁶⁾ 9 I p. 76.

growth which in later years prevented the Hollanders from extending their hegemony over the whole of this part of the Archipelago. The centre of Portuguese influence in the Lesser Sunda islands was now Larantuka in Flores, which contemporary Portuguese writers confusingly continued to call „Solor”; whilst they referred to the *Toepassen ofte swarte Portugeesen* as *Larantuqueiros*, even though, in course of time, the vast majority of these people lived not in Solor or in Flores but in Timor. This latter island was, as always, the centre of the sandalwood trade. It is rather peculiar that for so many years neither Portuguese nor Hollanders formed a fixed settlement on Timor, but contented themselves with annual trading trips to fetch sandalwood and slaves by virtue of ephemeral agreements with the local *Datus* and *Rajas* who maintained their real independence.

The first Dutch occupation of Fort Henricus, as they called their new conquest, did not last long, and even Dr. Rouffaer's painstaking researches have not entirely unravelled the exact sequence of the bewildering changes of ownership which the place underwent during the next fifty years. The Hollanders first abandoned the island in 1615, but were back again in 1618, after a tentative reappearance of the Dominicans in the previous year. Their commander on this occasion was Crijn van Raemburch, who beat off a half-hearted Portuguese attack on the fort, but was himself soundly thrashed when he tried to take Larantuka in May 1620. He was succeeded as *Opperhoofd* by Jan Thomaszoon Dayman, who set a precedent five years later by deserting to the Portuguese at Larantuka, where he died shortly afterwards, by poison if contemporary Dutch accounts are to be trusted⁷⁾. His nefarious example was followed by his successor, Jan de Hornay, who likewise deserted to Larantuka in February 1629, much to the annoyance of that grim Calvinist, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, we can imagine.

Jan de Hornay's desertion and the subsequent abandonment of Fort Henricus by the Hollanders, induced the Dominicans to reoccupy it in April 1630, with the help of men and materials made available by Nuno Alvarez Botelho's great victory over the Achinese at Malacca, and by the generosity of the inhabitants of Macao. The latter supplied a number of Chinese masons and a gunsmith, together with some cannon cast by Manoel Tavares Bocarro. The moving spirit in the reoccupation was Frei Miguel Rangel O.P., later Bishop of Cochin, who wrote a glowing account of the island, which he represented as an earthly Eden, where only Man was vile. His account (The *Relaçam* published at Lisbon in 1635)⁸⁾ extolls the island's upland rice, which did not need the laborious cultivation of the lowland Paddy variety. He further praises its prolific sheep, goats and buffalos; its tasty fruits and vegetables, and excellent drinking water, — this last always being a strong recommendation in the eyes of the abstemious Portuguese, who did not share the bibulous habits of their heretic foes, —

„The Dutch and English were here
And drank Toddy for want of Beer.”

He adduced the general longevity of its inhabitants as proof of the island's healthiness, his prize exhibit being the native Captain-Major of Militia, Francisco

⁷⁾ 10 1626 p. 254.

⁸⁾ 18 p. 23—25.

Fernandes, who was then over eighty years old and had another twenty five years of vigorous life before him. A Dominican account of 1665 even claims that he died at the ripe age of 130, having shortly before his death indulged in such extraordinary feats as begetting a child, and killing a water buffalo out hunting, „cousas todas, de que os Olandezes fizerao per sua morte hum papel autentico, oe mandarão a Olanda”⁹⁾. Antonio Bocarro, writing his official account of Portuguese Asia at Goa in 1635, also stresses the commercial prosperity of Solor, which was based on its flourishing sandalwood trade from Timor with Macao. This commerce was carried on via Macassar in galliots manned with native Christians and *Topasses*, whose fighting qualities were proved in many encounters by land and sea with the Hollanders. Their most striking victory was the capture of the Dutch yacht *Jaeger* with all her crew in 1630. These men came in very handy for an exchange of prisoners between Portuguese and Dutch which took place at Macassar in May 1632. A few years earlier an English trader from Celebes informed the Hollanders at Batavia that Portuguese influence at Sultan Allah Udin's court was so strong, that „comen jaerlijcx in Macassar omtrent 10 en 22 Portugiesche fregatten, en de somtijts wel 500 man op Maccassar sterck, de Coninck aldaer gedoocht dat sij haer exercitie van religie daer aen landt doen mogen Van Maccassar, seijde hij mede, houden de Portugiesen hare vaert op Timor, ende strecken van Maccassar recht boven de Pater Nosters nae de Strate van Bima over, welcke sij passeren, loopende van daer voorts nae de binnen ende buijten cust van Timor daer sij wesen willen.” He concluded by stating „In somma de Portugiesen hielden Maccassar voor haer Mallacca, ende voeren daer soo secure, gelijk off daer geen vijant meer in Indien was, om datse daer noch niet eens vernestelt sijn. Naer sijn seggen souden de Portugiesen in Macassar jaerlijcx verhandelen niet veel min als 5 a zes hondert duysent realen van 8en, dat qualijck te gelooven is”¹⁰⁾.

The Dominicans were not left undisturbed in their reoccupied stronghold. A Dutch expedition of six sail carrying 200 men under Commander Tombergen appeared off Fort Henricus on the 8th June 1636, and summoned the occupants to surrender „doch creegen van seecker paep (die 't commando daer binnen is hebbende) tot antwoord: sulcx niet te durven doen, alsoo de groote Padre ver-trocken ende hij maer een knecht van den selven sijnde, geresolveert bleef 't fort soo lange te houden, als hem mogelijk soude wesen, te meer hij Godt maer eenen doot schuldich was”¹¹⁾. This stout-hearted monk's answer is curiously reminiscent of a similar remark made by one of Shakespeare's comic characters, the conscripted tailor Francis Feeble in *King Henry IVth*¹²⁾ („I care not; a man can die but once; we owe God a death”) The *Paep* was as good as his word, and repulsed a subsequent Dutch attack (little more than a reconnaissance in force really) without trouble. Despite this success, the Dominicans abandoned the fort a few weeks later, which then remained untenanted for the next ten years, until its third occupation by the Hollanders in February 1646.

⁹⁾ 3 p. 20.

¹⁰⁾ 10 1625 p. 124 sqq.

¹¹⁾ 10 1636 p. 182; 23 II p. 311.

¹²⁾ part II act III scene II.

Dr. Rouffaer describes this as the „derde, en nu *definitieve* bezetting van het Fort Henricus op Solor door de Hollanders”; but loath as I am to differ from so distinguished an authority, I hesitate to agree with him. From the wording of a letter of „Niaij Tehili, sijnde de landtvoochdinne van 't landt van Solor” in 1657, it seems obvious that the Hollanders again evacuated Fort Henricus on the orders of Governor-General Maetsuijker, shortly after they had taken over the embryo Portuguese fort at Koepang¹³⁾. Moreover Livinius Bor in his *Amboinse Oorlogen* states „Het verplaetsen van 't fort *Henricus* heeft den Superintendent [de Vlamingh van Oudshoorn], op sijn overkomen tot Batavia, voorgedragen: daer op (so verstaen heb) de verhuising naderhand, doch, in plaets van *Roty* op *Timor* tot *Koupan* is gevolgd”¹⁴⁾. The likelihood of this is further confirmed by an entry in the *Dagh-register* for 2nd January 1665¹⁵⁾, which reads, „oock is op haer hoochheydts [the „Queen” of Solor] versoek goetgevonden 15 à 16 soldaten in het fort Henricus op Solor te leggen, ten ware datter eenige redenen contrarie gevonden mochten worden”. I am even doubtful if anything concrete came of this last rather hesitating decision, at least for long. As late as 1757, the government at Batavia was asking the Resident of Koepang to place a „bekwaam posthouder” on Solor, who should try to strengthen his position by marriage with a ruling *Donna* (or chieftainess) of Larantuka. Two years later, it is noted that Fort Henricus was threatened by the *Larantockers*, but their attack was repulsed although the assailants burnt down the native „*Negorijen* 's Compagnie huis en pagger”. The source from which these last notices are taken¹⁶⁾ makes no mention whatever of a European garrison on Fort Henricus and implies rather the place was held for the Company by the native ruler, as Larantuka was for the Portuguese Crown. But we have anticipated somewhat.

Whether abandoned or not *circa* 1650, Fort Henricus lapsed into complete obscurity at this period, its role as Dutch stronghold in the Lesser Sunda islands being replaced by Castle Concordia at Koepang. This place owed its origin to the energetic Dominican Friar, Antonio de São Jacinto, who obtained more lasting results than his predecessors in the conversion of native rulers on Timor. During the Viceroyalty of the Count of Aveiras (1640—1645) he began the construction of a fort at Koepang, which he rightly selected as being the best harbour and the strategic key to the island. His military efforts aroused unfriendly criticism amongst the Portuguese traders at Larantuka, who were curiously loath to leave Flores, with the result that Frei Jacinto was recalled to Goa in 1649, leaving the work in the hands of the Captain-Major Francisco Carneiro de Siqueira, who having quarrelled with the Friars at Larantuka, had established himself in another kampong nearby. Although Siqueira later claimed to have „built the fort at Koepang at his own cost”, it had not progressed very far when the Dutch took it over, which they did in 1653. The Opperhoofd of Solor, Major Willem Verbeeck who visited the place in 1648, reported that „het maer een huijsinge was voor drie a 4 personen”¹⁷⁾. Four years later, it was still in the hands of the Portuguese, but had evidently made no further progress, since the Dominicans

¹³⁾ 10 1657 p. 226.

¹⁴⁾ 2 p. 364.

¹⁵⁾ 10 1665 p. 3.

¹⁶⁾ 19.

¹⁷⁾ 10 1647—8 p. 91.

accused Siqueira of having neglected it, „leaving only some of his servants there, from whom the Hollanders took it without firing a shot”.

The Hollanders gave their new possession the name of Concordia, and speedily transferred their men and equipment thither from Fort Henricus that had never recovered from the terrible earthquake of February 1648, which had left it „genouchsaem gedemanteleert en open”¹⁸⁾. Major Verbeeck, who annoyed his superiors at Batavia by marrying a Solor princess, was replaced by an officer who was killed in a fight with the „Swarte Portuguees” Captain Mattheus da Costa on Timor about 1652. A few years later, Major Jacob Verheijden met a similar fate at the hands of the Eurasian swashbuckler Antonio de Hornay (son of the renegade Hollander Jan de Hornay and his native wife or concubine), being . . . „seer schendig van de zijnen verlaaten, en van dezen *Antonio d'Hornay* met een slagswaard ter neder-gekapt is”, as Valentijn¹⁹⁾ informs us. With the object of avenging these repeated reverses, the celebrated Arnold de Vlamingh van Oudtshoorn was sent to Timor in 1656 at the head of a strong force which had previously subjugated a formidable revolt in Amboina. De Vlamingh made two expeditions to the hinterland of Amarassi, where the combined forces of the Portuguese and *Toepassen* lay in wait for him under the command of the two redoubtable Eurasian captains, Antonio de Hornay and Mattheus da Costa. On both occasions he was compelled to withdraw in confusion to the shelter of Castle Concordia, losing a total of 170 white soldiers, besides numerous native auxiliaries. So discouraged was he by these unexpected reverses, that he left the island for Batavia and ordered the evacuation of Fort Henricus on Solor *en route*. The Hollanders laid the blame for their defeat on the defection of their native carriers . . . „Bij welk tussensval de swarten, siende wij aftogten, sodanich ontroerd werden, hun inbeeldende, d'onsen, door den vijand op de vlucht gedreven waren, sij pak, sak, ja ook 'er eige wapens afwierpen, en als blode guilen op de loop gepeurd sijn”²⁰⁾. This version, naturally enough, does not agree with that of the „Queen” of Solor, who complaining to G.G. Maetsuijcker of De Vlaming's order to dismantle Fort Henricus, asked pathetically „Wijders, wanneer de gouverneur heer Vlamingh uijt Ambon na Timor is getogen, wie sijn hem gevolcht anders dan drie van onse negerijen . . . want de heer de Vlamingh is een groot man, doch ick ben maer een vrouwe, wat verstant ofte macht hebbe ick bij soo een groot man? ende van degene die in de tocht na Timor achter den heer Vlamingh gevolcht sijn, wie heeft het cruijt ende kogels gedragen, wie heeft de londt gedragen, waren het die van Roti, ofte van Sauwo, ofte van Ambei, ofte van Soenebay, ofte soldaten, ofte matroosen, ofte wie warensen, die het volck dat op 't geberchte gequetst wierde afdroegen tot aen de chaloupen? deze waren immers mijn volck die het droegen, het sijn mede alle kinderen van sengadijs ende fraye lieden geweest, die alle tsamen sijn gebleven op Timor met Jacob van der Heijden; ende dat alleen om de saecke van de Compagnie, niet om eenige sake van ons op Solor”²¹⁾. The Dominican chroniclers attribute de

¹⁸⁾ l.c.

¹⁹⁾ 25 p. 125.

²⁰⁾ 2; cfr. II II 1 p. 256.

²¹⁾ 10 1657 p. 227-8.

Vlamingh's ignominious repulse to the miraculous appearance of their patron saint in the field and to other similar signs and wonders.

Although we can safely discount this celestial intervention, the sons of Saint Dominic can justly claim credit for a large share of the success of Portuguese arms. Thanks to their proselytising efforts on Timor, they could count on the support of a number of more or less sincerely converted *Datus* and their followers. This was frankly recognised by the Dutch historian Pieter van Dam who wrote, apropos of these struggles, that „de Portugeesen, als verre de sterckste sijnde, ende door haere papen en geestelijckheyt d'ingeseten meest aen haer zijde, en door dat middel veel avantagie boven ons gekregen hebbende, voort alles tot haer hebben getrocken”²²⁾.

Even during the uneasy Luso-Dutch Truce of 1644—1652, the Hollanders had perforce to get their sandalwood from Timor by virtue of a signed contract with the *Overste Paep* at Larantuka; and the Portuguese still managed to obtain the bulk of this commodity for themselves, despite the fact that unlike the Hollanders they had as yet no fixed foothold on Timor itself.

Their principal port of call was Lifao (alias Liefhouw) on the N.W. coast, the modern Ocussi or Okoessi, whose native ruler was one of Frei Jacinto's more important converts in July 1641. Larantuka on Flores continued to be their headquarters, since the Dutch missed two opportunities of taking it on their way to and from Macassar in the expedition commanded by van Dam and Truytman in 1660. On both occasions the Dutch fleet anchored in the bay, but although the place was virtually unfortified, and quite denuded of its garrison which had gone to the assistance of the native Christians on Pulo Ende, they neglected to occupy it, as they easily could have done. This inexplicable omission on their part, renders less fatuous than usual the inevitable Dominican claim of supernatural intervention, which this time took the form of the Virgin Mary at the head of a vast mounted host. No further opportunity occurred, as the Luso-Dutch Peace treaty of 1662, now put an end to the fifty year period of official hostilities in the Lesser Sunda islands. The Dutch conquest of Macassar in 1660 had the perhaps unforeseen effect of strengthening the position of the Portuguese in these parts, just as the fall of Malacca had previously led to the growth of their influence at Macassar, owing to the emigration of numerous Eurasian and native Catholics who would not live under the heretic conquerors. Thus the commercial prosperity of Larantuka and Timor received a distinct fillip with the arrival of many exiles from Celebes, chief of whom was Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo, a wealthy Portuguese merchant who had traded at Macassar for a quarter of a century, and who prior to his expulsion in 1664, had been one of the powers behind the Sultan's throne. Although the sandalwood trade from Timor with Macao was his main source of income, he likewise traded to Indochina and the Coromandel and Konkan coasts, and on more than one occasion acted as the Viceroy of Goa's envoy to the Governor-General at Batavia. The Hollanders were naturally very jealous of his influence at Macassar, where he was on particularly friendly terms with Sultan Hassan Udin²³⁾ and his Minister

²²⁾ II II 1 p. 258.

²³⁾ 21 p. 67.

Kareng Patengaloan, the latter of whom spoke and wrote fluent Portuguese and was an enthusiastic collector of European books, maps and sea-charts.

On arriving (somewhat reluctantly) at Larantuka, Vieira set about building a large wooden house for himself, and furthering Portuguese influence on Timor where he appointed his nominee, named Simão Luis, as Captain-Major. This man, though a brave soldier who had distinguished himself in the repulse of de Vlamingh's expedition, was a monster of cruelty. The Batavian *Dagh-Register* of 10th July 1664²⁴⁾, records that „249 mannen, vrouwen en kinderen, bondgenooten der Portugeezen . . . tot ons overgecomen waren om het geweld en de tirannye der Portugesen te ontgaen, ende dat niettegenstaende de Portugesen de wegen alomme beset gehouden hadden: hebbende den capitain Simon Louis, een van de Coningen van Ampitey, in tegenwoordigheyt van d'andere omleggende Coningskens, onder zijn gebied staende, op Liffou opgehangen het doode lichaem aen riemen gesneden, de stucken aen haer omgedeeft en hun gedwongen het vlees op te eten en het bloed van den dooden Coning te drincken, quansuys om haer een afschrik te doen hebben van het overloopen, dewijl een ander van de Ampiteysche Koningskens tot de onse was overgecomen; een onmenschelijke daed voorwaer en te afschouwelijker, omdat het geschiet van de gene die den naem van Christenen willen dragen". Simon Luis died soon after this frightful exhibition, and Vieira then transferred his support to Antonio de Hornay, who began a long duel for supremacy with his colleague and rival Mattheus de Costa, which after many reverses of fortune was finally settled in favour of the former owing to the death of the latter in 1673. This dispute inaugurated a long period of enmity between the two families of the Hornays and the Costas for the acknowledged supremacy over the „*Toepassen of sogenaamde swarte Portugeezen*" in Timor, Solor and Flores islands.

The Portuguese authorities at Goa and Macao were for long unable to intervene effectively in these internecine disputes, or to exert their nominal authority over their unruly subjects in these parts. At one stage in the long drawn-out Hornay—Costa duel, the Viceroy of Goa dispatched an emissary named João Antunes Portugal with a sealed patent of governorship, addressed to de Hornay and another to da Costa, with orders to present only that addressed to whoever he found in power at the time, concealing the other from both parties. The local winner chancing to be Antonio de Hornay, he was accordingly officially recognised as Captain-General, although da Costa refused to accept this decision, since he had an earlier patent which he claimed was still valid. On another occasion the Viceroy sent Letters-Patent to certain leading Portuguese at Larantuka empowering them to take over the government. These individuals, fearful of incurring the wrath of the all-powerful de Hornay, merely handed their documents unopened over to him. De Hornay was henceforth left alone till his death at the ripe old age of eighty, by which time he was virtually the uncrowned King of Timor, save for the country in the immediate vicinity of Casteel Concordia at Koepang. He maintained the pretence of being a loyal subject of the Portuguese Crown, by periodic princely donations to the impecunious Viceregal Treasury at Goa, including a quantity of gold-dust valued at 23,000 silver

²⁴⁾ 10 1664 p. 271.

xerafines. He amassed great wealth through his monopoly of the sandalwood trade, often boasting that he would leave it to the King of Portugal after his death. He maintained Portuguese territorial claims in his correspondence with the Governor-General at Batavia, even extending them to include the whole of Solor. The Hollanders were compelled to negotiate with him for the purchase of the sandalwood they required, and altogether he was largely a law unto himself.

On his death the power passed to his younger brother, Francisco de Hornay, who however was not so strong a character. He was speedily deposed by the Viceroy's nominee, a Macao-born fidalgo named Antonio de Mesquita Pimentel, who was thus the first government-appointed official to assume office in despite of local opposition. Pimentel's success proved short-lived; for soon after he had taken over the post of „Governor and Captain-General of the islands of Solor and Timor“, amidst scenes of great rejoicing at Larantuka and Lifao in 1695, he was expelled by a popular rising, apparently headed by Domingos da Costa. The reason for this volte-face was alleged to be his murder of two of Antonio de Hornay's bastard children, aggravated by the levying of unpopular taxes. The fact that he was subsequently acquitted by the High Court at Goa of these charges and ended his career as Captain-General of Bardez, perhaps indicates that local dislike of direct rule by Goa was the chief if not the only reason for his expulsion.

The temporary eclipse of the Hornays due to their forceful suppression by Mesquita Pimentel, left the field clear for the Costas, whose representative was in control of all Timor save Koepang by the end of the century. The Government at Goa now made another attempt to assert their authority by the dispatch of Antonio Coelho Guerreiro as Governor in 1701. This fidalgo, who had been in the colonial service since 1668, working his way up from the post of private soldier at Pernambuco to that of Secretary of State at Goa, was responsible for the transference of the seat of government (such as it was) from Larantuka to Lifao, where he founded the first *permanent* Portuguese settlement early in 1702, with men and material brought from Macao. He was also responsible for beginning the system whereby military ranks such as Colonel, Major, and so on were granted to leading tribal chiefs, *Datus* and headmen in return for their swearing formal fealty to the Crown. This system lasted down to modern times, and at one period in the eighteenth century it was even copied by the Hollanders. Thus the Portuguese titles of *Dom* and *Capitão* were given to the son of the Raja of Maubara in 1765, and a request for similar honours was made to the Resident at Koepang by two other petty chiefs next year²⁹).

The Viceroy's instructions to Governor Guerreiro in 1701, clearly reveal the fundamental weakness of the Portuguese position in Timor. The difficult situation confronting the potential Governor was considered virtually insuperable from the beginning. Thus, the landing-place will be chosen where it is possible to land. The sandalwood trade driven by the Hollanders will be hindered . . . if practicable. The rebellious da Costa will be suppressed . . . if circumstances permit. The disloyal colonists will be treated . . . cautiously and deceitfully. If the Dutch have occupied any Portuguese territory . . . „you will conduct yourself in such a way as to give them no pretext for breaking the peace“. And so

²⁹) 19 pp. 209—210.

forth and so on. In extenuation of this temporising policy, it must be admitted that the slender material resources of the State of India scarcely permitted anything else. Of ten frigates which formed the Portuguese Armada in the Indian Ocean in 1701, only one was seaworthy. Troops were so few and far between, that although Guerreiro asked for a minimum force of 650 men, the Viceroy could only spare him fifty soldiers.

The situation in Timor at the turn of the century was described with fair accuracy by the 'interloping' Scots Captain Alexander Hamilton as follows.

„The natives acknowledge the King of Portugal their Sovereign, and have embraced the Romish Religion. They permitted the Portuguese colony of Macao in China, to build a Fort on it, which they called Leiffew, and the Dutch a factory called Coupang, but would never suffer either to interfere with the Government of their country. The Portuguese of Maccao drove a very advantageous trade to Timor for many years, and finding the natives to be passive Catholics, tried by fair means to get the whole government of the country into the Church's hands, but could not beguile them that way, therefore they tried force, and commenced a war, but to their cost they found that the Timoreans would not lose their liberty for fear of the loss of blood that war with the City of Maccao lasted about fifteen years. It began about the year 1688, and was not quite finished in the year 1703, and Maccao in the end was quite ruined by it, for it exhausted both their stock of men and money to such a degree, that of 1.000 citizens the town had before the war, there was hardly fifty left at the end of it, and of forty sail of trading ships, not above five left The Product of the island is sandalwood, the best and largest in the World, which is a great commodity in China, also Gold and Bees-wax. The Gold is plentiful but of a low touch, not amounting to 20 Carats fine. And all manner of Provisions are plentiful and cheap, but no anchoring about the island, except at Leifauw and Coupang. And the coast is subject to frequent Tornadoes, or squalls of wind and rain, introduced with much thunder and lightening. The natives report, that at a certain season of the year, after the South-West Monsoons are set in, they can discern an high mountainous land to the Southward of them, and continues in sight from December to the latter end of February, or the Beginning of March, and then disappears. If the Report be true, it must be some floating island, that comes from and goes to New Holland, which is the next tract of land to the South of Timor. These accounts I had from a Portuguese Gentleman, called Alexander Pinto, who was a Captain at Leifauw four years, and was bound from Batavia to Goa, Anno 1704. He went Passenger with me, and seemed to be a man of Probity²⁶⁾).

I can find no mention of any Captain Alexander Pinto on Timor or elsewhere at this period; and the suspicion that this pseudo-Pinto was none other than Antonio Coelho Guerreiro in disguise, is strengthened by the following otherwise rather cryptic entries in the *Realia*²⁷⁾.

„20 Februari 1705. Tegens den Portugeesen Gouverneur op Liffao, over zijne drie jaren lang gepleegde feijtelijkheden, zal een protest afgezonden werden.

26 Juni 1705. Het afzenden van dat protest werd uijtgesteld.

²⁶⁾ 15 Ch. 45.

²⁷⁾ 17 II p. 149 and III pp. 81 and 94.

26 Juni 1705. Den gewezen Liffaosen Gouverneur hier clandestien aangekomen zijnde, zal over de feijtelijkheeden door hem gepleegd niet werden aengesproken.

12 Juli 1705. Zijn verzoek om aan land te mogen komen g'acordeert."

It is true that Hamilton says he took his Portuguese „man of probity” passenger from Batavia in 1704 and not in 1705; but writing as he did some twenty years later he could easily have made a mistake of one year, and otherwise the facts fit remarkably well. As to why Governor Guerreiro was in disguise, that is easily explained. In the first place he had left his post at Lifao (which had been rendered untenable by a four year blockade by the rebellious Domingos da Costa) without orders from his superiors at Goa; and secondly he had, again in defiance of the Viceroy's orders, openly quarrelled with the Hollanders on Timor, seizing their sloop *Doradus*, and addressing an insulting official letter to Jan van Alphen, the Resident of Koepang, „and the other rats of his Nest”. It is therefore hardly surprising that he should have hesitated to appear openly before the Dutch authorities whom he had so roundly abused; but it certainly is rather surprising that Governor-General Johan van Hoorn and his Council should have allowed him to land unmolested, and contented themselves with forwarding the protest originally intended for him, to the Viceroy of Goa, who needless to say ignored it.

Despite these internecine wars, Timor seems to have been relatively prosperous in the last quarter of the 17th century. A perusal of the monthly shipping lists printed in the Batavian *Dagh-Registers* for 1663—1682, shows that vessels trading between Macao and Timor frequently called at Japara, Batavia and Bantam. The mainstay of the Macao-Timor trade was still the aromatic sandalwood so highly prized by the Chinese, which even if it no longer yielded the 200 % profit it did in Bishop Rangel's time (1630), still sufficed to pay for the upkeep of the garrison and governmental expenses of Macao. Slaves were the next most profitable commodity, a steady supply of these poor wretches being assured by the perennial wars of the Hornays and Costas. Gold-dust, honey and the hardy little Timorese horses were the other exports.

There seems to have been something about the atmosphere of Timor which was conducive to violence however, for battle, murder and sudden death was the order of the day amongst its unruly inhabitants. Thus early in 1668, the *Swarte Portugeesen* held „seer leelijck huys” amongst the inhabitants of Pulo Kisser, killing 200 people, mainly women and children, and carrying away 450 persons as slaves, most of whom were later rescued by an expedition sent by Jacob Cops, the Governor of Banda. Dutch indignation at this atrocity is somewhat discounted by their own behaviour on Rotti island, where they massacred 500 unsuspecting natives in a night attack on a rebellious village about the same time²⁶⁾. Severe skirmishes between Portuguese and Dutch stooges on Timor took place in 1680, as related in the Batavian *Dagh-Register* for that year²⁷⁾. On the 23rd October 1674, the Resident at Japara wrote that „seekere twee Portugeeze capiteyns, met een scheepje van Timor 4 dagen te vooren daer gekomen, malkanderen hadden ter neder geleyt ende noch twee haerer secunde swaerlijk gequetst”. Dutch soldiers

²⁶⁾ 11 II 1 pp. 257—9.

²⁷⁾ 10 1680 pp. 569—570.

and sailors continued to desert periodically to the Portuguese of Lifao and Larantuka, which became a kind of Alsatia, largely populated by vagabond European and Eurasian cutthroats with their native consorts. Not that the Dutch garrison of Koepang were a much more edifying lot, if the report of Koopman Anthony Hurt dated 7 August 1665 may be taken as typical of their conduct, — „In het particulier rapport, door meergemelte coopman Hurt, aen haer Edele overgesonden, schrijft hij bevonden te hebben, dat op Timor, soo wel van de minste, als van de meeste, een seer vuyl, slordig en ongereguleert leven is geleyt, soo met droncken drincken, als hoereeren, daer het opperhooft, Culenburg, de andere als een capiteyn in voorgegaan heeft”³⁰⁾. Nearly a century later the visiting Commissary Paravicini expressed an equally unflattering opinion of Koepang and its inhabitants. „Wanneer men”, he wrote in August 1756, „ze al te zamen in een mand kon doen en telkens ’t onderste boven keeren, altijd of een laatzie (*sic*) of luijaard of onbequame, of een dronkaart of stoorder van de gemeene rust boven zou komen”³¹⁾.

The moral laxity prevalent amongst the Dutch and Portuguese laity on Timor was equally marked amongst the Dominican Friars who worked in the Portuguese part of the island. Their scandalous and unclerical conduct was the cause of repeated criticism by the authorities at Goa, where their Vicar-General could only plead in extenuation that „the native women were exceedingly lascivious and frequented the priest’s houses, principally the young ones, both by night and day, leaving the clergy with no other remedy save flight from their own homes”³²⁾. Typical of these unruly monks was the Goanese Friar Manuel de Santo Antonio O.P., titular Bishop of Malacca from 1701 to 1733. In his early days he was an exemplary missionary, Governor Guerreiro (himself a caustic critic of the average Dominican Friar) terming him a „human angel” who was responsible for the conversion of over 10,000 natives in the space of five years. Authority however evidently went to his head, for the Viceroy Fernandes Cezar de Menezes complained in 1713, that the Bishop „forgetful of his duties as a Prelate, was only interested in those of a General or a Politician”. „A temptation”, he added slyly, „to which many of the clergy succumb”. The Viceroy further accused him of stirring up civil strife in Timor, — an accusation which was evidently not without foundation, for Friar Manoel forcibly expelled the Governor of Lifao in 1720.

In order to cope with this anarchial state of affairs, a carefully-selected Governor, named Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho was sent as Captain-General in 1722. Albuquerque, a one-armed fidalgo of Brazilian birth, had a romantic and distinguished career in Macao, of which colony he had been an unwontedly popular and successful Governor in 1718—19. A man of firm character and hot temper, he was determined to stand no nonsense from the bellicose Bishop; and when the latter proved recalcitrant, he summarily deported him from the Colony. It must be admitted however, that Albuquerque’s drastic action, remarkable in a man of his priest-ridden nation, did not improve matters much. Whether instigated by the Bishop or not, a widespread revolt was brewing throughout the

³⁰⁾ 10 1665 pp. 283—4.

³¹⁾ 8 p. 216.

³²⁾ 12 p. 5 of the Documentos quoted at the end of the book.

island. The *Topasses* under Francisco de Hornay, joined with the native chiefs in a plot to drive out the white Portuguese once and for all. The conspirators celebrated their compact by the sacrificial slaughter of a black and white dog, whose blood they then mixed with their own and drank ceremonially. The signal for revolt was given by the massacre of two Dominican missionaries in the interior, and the destruction of such churches as they could find. Albuquerque did not quail before the storm, and maintained his position at Lifao until the arrival of his successor, when the rebellion fizzled out. He accused the Dutch of supporting the rebels with arms and ammunition, sending an official protest to the Governor-General at Batavia. This document was ignored by the *Hooge Regeering*, which is hardly surprising, as there is little doubt that Albuquerque's suspicions were ill-founded. Reference to the third volume of *Realia* and to J. de Roo van Alderwerelt's *Aanteekeningen*, will show that the Batavian authorities did in fact repeatedly forbid their subordinates at Koepang to interfere in the internecine disputes between the Black and the White Portuguese, and enjoined the maintenance of a strictly neutral attitude. Albuquerque also endeavoured to stop the alleged smuggling of sandalwood from Portuguese-controlled territory by Batavian Chinese. The forcible measures he adopted for this purpose were criticized by his successor as making matters worse rather than better.

The abortive general rebellion of 1722—25, flared up again in a fiercer form soon after the arrival of Colonel Pedro de Mello as Captain-General in 1729. The alliance between the *Toepassen* and the natives *pur sang* was resumed, each of the allies intending to turn on the other when their common aim of expelling the white Portuguese had been achieved. Despite the fact that he had less than fifty Europeans and a few Macaonese with him, Pedro de Mello made a manful effort to crush the revolt. Most of the native auxiliaries who supported him were secretly in league with the rebels, and he was eventually closely besieged in the little port of Manatuto on the 18 October 1730. The siege lasted for eighty-five days, during which the garrison was latterly forced to subsist on „the leaves of trees, powdered horse-bones and vermin“, until a final desperate sortie on the 13th—15th January 1731 drove off the besiegers. This revolt, like all previous and subsequent ones, fizzled out with the arrival of a new Governor in March, when things reverted to the uneasy *status quo ante*. Like his predecessors, Pedro de Mello accused the Hollanders at Koepang of aiding and abetting the rebels. This they indignantly denied, and accused him in their turn, and with more reason, of giving refuge to the „moordadige deserteurs van de afgelopen pantjalang *De Lethij*“. The Portuguese Governor in 1731 also „landt op Embang, laat aldaar 3 menschen doodslaan en roofd padie en catjang, houdt ook een Chinees vaartuig aan van hier, en laat hem 10 pct. van zijn lading afnemen, bovendien gemeld vaartuig ontlost, en, tot eigen gebruik gezonden naar Dillij. Hij schrijft het opperhoofd aan alle vaartuigen van de zwarte Portugezen aan te houden en, bij weigering, onze vaartuigen zoude aanhalen, verbied wijders eenige pas anders als op Lifao te verleen“³³). Further Dutch efforts to secure restitution of the sloop, mutineers and metal cannon, were equally fruitless, the new Governor, Pedro de Rego Barreto de Gama e Castro, declaring roundly

³³) 19 pp. 195—6.

that „de Nederlanders niet meer grond toekomt als met het canon kan beschoten worden”.

Meanwhile the turbulent *Toepassen* having been foiled in their efforts to take Lifao or Manatuto and drive their nominal white overlords from the island, turned their attention towards the Hollanders of Casteel Concordia at Koepang. After two preliminary demonstrations in 1735 and 1745, a far more serious attack was made in 1749. „Den Koning van Amabij, quam op den 18den October het opperhoofd met veel ontsteltenis bekend maken, dat zijn volk in de bovenlanden en gebergte een grouwsaeme menigte gewappend volk hadden gesien en veele trommels gehoord, waaruyt sekerlijk besloot, zulks de Toepassen moesten zijn; op welk berigt wij dan ook, aan d'eene kant, eenige Mardijkers afgesonden, om deselve te verspieden, en aan de andere kant, den koning van Coupang gelaste, in stilte een vertrouweling naar Amarassie te senden, aangesien ons te gelijk berigt werd, dat den Tenentij-Generaal op die plaats in persoon was aangekomen, ten eijnde ons gesamentlijk te overvallen”. From these scouts, the Opperhoofd and his Council learnt that the enemy was „reets van Amarassie in aantogt, en bevonden sig in 't selve 2.800 snaphanen buijten die der Amarassiers en bestonden de voornaamste hoofden in de volgende persoonen: *Gaspar da Costa* (Tenente-General); *Pasqual da Costa* (Tenente de Provincia); *Siko Bras* (Tenente-Coronel); *Domingo de Faria* (Capitão-mor da Pouoação); *Sinao Luis* (Capitão-mor do campo); *Amaro da Costa* (Sargento-Mor da Provincia); *Bastiano*, nieuwe keijser van Amacone, met zijn Generaals, Colonels enz.; *Paulo*, koning van Ambeno, met als even: *Januario Fernandes Varella*, hoofd der Laran-toekers, en eijndelijk verscheijde koningen zo der onder hun geweld staande Belonesen als andere Timorese landen”. The *Toepassen* carried „s konings van Portugals vlag, standaard en baniere, bij haar *El Real* genaamt”.

Although the Company's native auxiliaries were terrified at the „schrikkelijke menigte” of the oncoming *Toepassen*, the Opperhoofd and Council put a bold face on the matter, and sent an emissary „met last aan de hoofden van dit afkomende rot, wie deselve ook mogten zijn te seggen, dat bijaldien hunne moedwil zo verre mogte gaan van voet te setten op 't Coupangse gebied zij versekert moesten zijn, dat zoo d'E.Compe als haare bondgenoten zeer gereet waren, geweld met geweld te keeren, en hun zodanig rukeloos bestaan dier betaalt te stellen”

„Inmiddels vertoonde zig op den 4n November een grouwsame menigte dezer stropers reets tot op het land van Coupang, met slaande trommels, en vliegende [Portugesche] vendels, op welke tijding alle onse inlanders tegelijk een schrik aanquam”. Nevertheless the Hollanders by drastic methods succeeded in scraping together a motley force of „1 sergeant, 2 corporaals en 20 gemeen, 130 Mardijkers, 240 Savonesen, 60 Soloresen, 30 Rottinesen, en eenige vrijwilligers, 30 's E.Comps. dienaren als burgers” which under the command of Ensign Lip, sallied forth to give battle to the *Toepassen* and Amarassiers, in their stone paggers on the field of Penefoeij, Sunday the 9th November 1749. Perhaps as a result of a preliminary skirmish two days previously which had gone in favour of the Hollanders, the Amarassiers deserted their allies on the appearance of Lip's little force, and marched off the field unmolested. The *Toepassen* sallied forth from their entrenchments, but were driven back after a heavy skirmish, with the Hollanders and Mardijkers hard on their heels. When four

of their paggers had been stormed, the Dutch Timorese auxiliaries, who had hitherto mostly been passive spectators of the conflict, „nu moet grijpende, deselve bijna van rontsom aanvielen, en daaronder zodanig een vreselijke slagting maakte, dat in een oogenblik het veld als met verslagenen bedekt wierd; intusschen vonde de onse in dese laatste verschansing een seer hardneckige tegenstand, wijl de daarin zijnde Tenentij en andere hooge officieren, de slagting der hunne van rondsom en geene uitkomst siende, sig als desperaat verweerden; eindelijk egter, moesten zij voor 't geweld van 's E.Comps. wappenen bukken, wanneer deselve door de Europeërs, Mardijkers en brave Savonesen gezamentlijk bestormt zijnde veroverd wierd; thans tragteden de daarin zijnde het met de vlugt te ontkomen, maar de onse waren haar te kort op de hielen. Schrikkelijk was nu hare nederlag aan alle kanten, zo binnen als buyten, te meer, wijl de onse sig van des vijands paarden hadden meester gemaakt, en deselve mede te beter vervolgde; den Tenentij met 3 à 4 man onder het veroveren van haare laatste verschansing, te paard de vlugt genomen hebbende, wierd omtrent duijzend schreden van daar, door een Timorees met een assegaij ter neder geslagen, en terstond mede als alle de vorige verslagene onthalt. Het getal derselve niet wel te begroten zijnde, is het nochtans zeker, dat onse Timoresen nog dien avond omtrent duijzend en binnen twee dagen, nog wel so veel koppen, in triumph afbragten, terwijl sij den vijand nog onophoudelijk vervolgde; wij darentegens, hebben niet meer als 19 Timoresen, eene Mardijker en 2 vrijwilligers verlooren, hoewel de gequetste niet wijnige waren”.

Vaandrig Lip's victory on this Bloody Sunday, not only saved Koepang from the Black Portuguese, but, in all probability, the Dutch position on Solor and Rotti as well, since Gaspar da Costa's colleague and successor, João de Hornay, lay ready to follow up the expected victory with an attack on those islands. As it was however, the battle of Penefoeij proved a turning-point in the history of Timor; for from now on the Hollanders rather than the Portuguese exerted the principal influence in the western half of the island. The share of the Mardijkers in this victory, although not so great as later legendary accounts which ascribe the sole credit to them would have us believe, was evidently a considerable one. At any rate they subsequently obtained such influence in Koepang and district as to enable them to intimidate their white overlords in much the same way as the Black Portuguese did the Whites at Lifao.

In the official relation of the Penefoeij campaign compiled by the Opperhoofd Jacob van der Burgh and his Council on the 18th May 1750, from which the above extracts are taken ⁸⁴), the attitude of the Portuguese Governor of Lifao, Manuel Correia de Lacerda, is described as follows: „Intusschen zijn wij zeer verwondert, dat den Gouverneur van Lifao sig uitterlijk gedragt als of zijn E. alle dese saken gansch niet aangingen, kunnende zelfs niet vernemen, dat zig daarover ooijt anders heeft uijtgelaten, dan met te seggen, dat het den Tenentijs wel verdiende loon was, en hem niet alleen dikwijls mondeling dese dwase onderneming had afgeraden, maar ook gedurende zijne optogt hem drie opontbod-brieven had geschreven, welke hij selve niet verwaardigt had te b'antwoorden”.

It is hardly surprising that Van der Burgh was tempted by his success to

⁸⁴) 14 pp. 389 sqq.

dream of driving the Portuguese clean out of Timor; nor that now, for the first time, the Government at Batavia favoured an offensive policy on the island, and sent an expedition of 100 men, with cannon, munitions and provisions to reduce the southern coastal tribes. Nothing came of this however, and the Batavian authorities soon reverted to their former policy of strongly discouraging any fishing in troubled Portuguese waters. So far did they carry this attitude, that when the energetic and ambitious German Opperhoofd of Koepang, Hans Albregt von Pluskow, was murdered by the Black Portuguese chieftains Francisco de Hornay and Antonio da Costa at Lifao in 1761, during his ill-advised attempt to reinstate an expelled Portuguese Governor, the *Hooge Regeering* expressly forbade any reprisals, „vooreerst omdat onmagt het belet op een élatante wijze te doen, en ten tweede omdat het schuld van het opperhoofd Von Pluskow is geweest, daar hij zich om eigen glorie en gewin met zaken heeft bemoeid die de Compagnie nimmer tot voordeel konden zijn”²⁵). They took a similar negative attitude in 1767—69, after some slight preliminary hesitation, when Francisco de Hornay (who had now changed sides again) offered them the possession of Lifao, which he was then closely besieging.

The Governor of Lifao, Antonio José Telles de Menezes (a previous Governor of Macao in 1747/8) had been so foolish as to murder 23 „aanzienlijke zwarte Portugeezen”, who had entered Lifao to treat with him under a flag of truce, with the result that the embittered de Hornay pressed the siege more closely than ever. After this had gone on for over a year, Menezes found himself in a parlous plight with 1,200 mouths to feed, most of them women and girls, and only 15 white men in the garrison. There was no hope of relief from Goa or Macao, and provisions being almost exhausted, he took the desperate resolve of abandoning the place on the night of the 11/12 August 1769. The garrison, populace, and as much artillery and stores as possible were embarked on what shipping was available in the harbour; and after setting fire to the remaining material on shore, Menezes set sail eastwards.

After landing some supplies at Batugade, the little flotilla cast anchor at Dilli, on the 10th October. In this unhealthy and malarial site, which had nevertheless the advantage of being pretty far removed from the area controlled by de Hornay, da Costa, and the *Toepassen* around Lifao and Larantuka, he founded the new capital of Portuguese Timor, where it has remained (at times somewhat precariously) ever since. Francisco de Hornay again offered Jan Compagnie the possession of Lifao after it had been abandoned by Menezes, but the offer was finally rejected by the *Hooge Regeering* at Batavia in December 1770. Naturally enough, they decided it would be too dangerous to found a settlement in the headquarters of such an unruly nest of rebels. By this time also the Costas and Hornays had reached an agreement whereby the headship of the *Topasses* alternated between the two families. Thus after the defeat and death of Gaspar da Costa at Penefoeij in 1749, his successor as *Tenente-General* was not a da Costa but a de Hornay.

Lifao was thus preserved for the Portuguese Crown, since the fickle Hornays soon returned to their old if nominal allegiance, and the banner of the


²⁵) 13.

*Quinas*²⁰⁾ flies over the enclave of Okussi to-day, — an historical anachronism comparable with Franco-Dutch Saint Martin in the West-Indies, or British Honduras in Central-America.


A facsimile of a handwritten signature in dark ink. The signature is highly stylized and cursive, appearing to read 'Antonio Coelho Guerreiro'. It features long, sweeping horizontal strokes at the beginning and end, with a dense, intricate cluster of loops and flourishes in the middle.

*Facsimile of the signature of Antonio Coelho Guerreiro, Macao.
December 1701 (collection of C.R.B.).*

²⁰⁾ The arms of Portugal, five shields arranged in the form of a Cross, each shield containing bezants symbolising the five wounds of Christ, and (counting the middle shield twice), the thirty pieces of silver for which Our Lord was sold. These arms are popularly but inaccurately supposed to have been assumed by Affonso Henriques in consequence of a celestial vision on the eve of the celebrated battle of Ourique, 1139.



SKETCH MAP OF TIMOR-SOLOR GROUP





Dutch expedition on Timor in the middle of the 17th century.
Reproduced by courtesy of the Mitchell Library, Sydney.

- | | |
|--|--|
| A de bergh klip Laj Haj met digt bos beset. | K t canon ende hem Mr Jan van de Velde. |
| B de rugh daar t dorp op leijd en ontoegankelijk is. | L stand plaats der Macassaren ende Baljers |
| C tbergie aan de oost kant wiens voet de zee bespoelt. | M vijands loop graven. |
| D t strand beset met tifer boomen. | N ontoegankelijke valeij met digt bos beset. |
| E den zerg ^t Aldorp met zijn volck. | O hoogh gebergte vanwaar de Timoresen vrugteloos naden vijand schoten. |
| F den zerg ^t Reinier Woucheer (?) met zijn volck. | P vlugtende Timoresen. |
| H twee Comp ^e marine onder Oosterbaan en Schouten. | Q valeij met tijfer boomen beset. |
| G den luyten ^t Joan Fransz ^{en} die met 18 snap-
hanen ter loopgraaff invalt. | R stand plaats van hier rontom teanon beset
met Rottenesen voor den aanval. |
| Y den zerg ^t Joris Heussen die met zijn volck
den luy ^t volgde. | S pagger bij ons na den aenval opgeworpen. |
| | T tent daar de oorlogs voor raat onder lagh. |
| | V pagger van doorens voorde leus. |
| | W gragt door de regen gemaackt. |

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TRANSLITERATION OF ALVARÁ OF 1576.

O G^{or} Da India etc., faço saber aos q esta meu alvr^a vier, que eu ej por bem e me praz q apresẽtando os padres da ordẽ De são Dominguos residentes na çidade de Malaq^a pesoa allgua pera capitão mor no porto de solor como tẽ por prouisaõ pera fauor Da cristandade a confirmará na dita Capitanja aijres de saldanha q ora vaij por capitão Da dita fortaleza achãdo na dita pesoa a suficiẽcia neçesarija de modo q neste caso ej por seruiço Del Rej meu s^{or} q a presẽtação seja Dos ditos padres e a confirmação Do dito capitão aijres de saldanha o que mando q asj o cumpra e guarde, como se neste cot^o [?] se duujda nẽ ebarguo allgum, e este valerá como carta [uncertain] e nome de sua allteza e selada de seu selo pedẽte se ebarguo da ordenação Do 2^o L^o f^o 20 g^o cõtr^o dispõe Dioguo cardoso o fez e goa a xiiij de setr^o de jbcclxxbj.

(autograph
signature)

Ant^o moniz brt^o

Alur^a á aijres de saldanha q ora vaj por capitão da fortaleza de Malaq^a p^a V.S.ver.

TRANSLATION OF ALVARÁ

Governor of India etc., I make known to all those who see this Decree, that I deem it fit and proper that if the fathers of the Order of Saint Dominic residing in the City of Malacca select anybody as Captain-Major of the port of Solor, as they are entitled to do by a provision in favour of christianising, their choice will be confirmed in the said captaincy by Aijres de Saldanha who now goes as Captain of the said fortress, on the understanding that he finds the said nominee duly qualified, in such wise that in this case I regard it as necessary for the service of my Lord the King, that the selection should be made by the said fathers, and the confirmation by the said Captain Aijres de Saldanha, the which I order to be thus done and kept, as herein set forth [?] without any doubt or scruple whatsoever, and this will be valued as a letter [passed?] in His Highnesses' name and sealed with his hanging seal, in despite of the ordinance of fol. 20 of Book 2 to the contrary Diogo Cardoso wrote it in Goa 14 September of 1576.


(autograph signature of Antonio Moniz Barreto)

At bottom of page:


Decree for Aijres de Saldanha who now goes as Captain for the fortress of Malacca. For Your Worship to see.


N.B. The document is endorsed on the back by JORGE DE LEMOS, a onetime secretary of the State of India, and author of an exceedingly rare book on the siege of Malacca by the Achinese and Javanese in 1574/5, entitled — *Hystoria dos Cercos que em Tempo de Antonio Moniz Barreto Governador que foi dos estados da India, os Achens e laos puserão à fortaleza de Malacca, sendo Tristao Vaz da Veiga capitao della* (Lisboa, Manoel de Lyra, 1585) 4^o 144 pp.

The signer of the document, ANTONIO MONIZ BARRETO, had a long and distinguished career in the East, to which he first came out as a mere youth in 1529. He was Governor of India from 9.XII.1573 to September 1577, when he was sent back to Portugal under arrest. AYRES DE SALDANHA came out to India for the first time in 1558, and was Viceroy of India from November 1600 to May 1604, during which Viceroyalty the foundations of the Dutch power in the East were laid.



Map of the beach of Lifao 1704.





903A



Druk de Bussy, Amsterdam

